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INTRODUCTION 
The Utah State Tax Commission petitions this Court for 
a rehearing to reconsider two points of law in its decision 
issued on November 13, 2000. (A copy is attached as Exhibit 
A.) Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35, a rehearing is 
appropriate when there is a misstatement of the law. It is 
not the intent of this Petition to change the ultimate 
holding of this Court which reversed the decision of the Tax 
Commission, but rather to alert the Court of certain 
misstatements of the law contained in the Order. This 
petition is filed in good faith and not for delay. 
The first statement deals with the Commission's power 
to lower tax rates which exceed the certified rate. The 
second statement concerns the Tax Commission's 
constitutional authority to administer the tax laws of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSIONS AUTHORITY TO LOWER A TAXING ENTITY7 S 
RATE IS NOT LIMITED TO THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE 
RATE EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM RATE SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 59-2-908. 
The first statement of concern is in % 10 of the 
decision where the Court stated, 
The statute clearly states that the 
Division may only lower the tax rate if 
it exceeds the "maximum levy." See id. § 
1 
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59-2-914(1) (a) . The maximum levy is 
defined by statute as: ".0032 per dollar 
of taxable value in all counties with a 
total taxable value of more than 
$100,000,000. .. ." Id. § 59-2-908(1) (a) 
(1996). The Commission acknowledged 
during oral argument that Alpine's T 
adopted tax rate does not exceed this 
figure. 
The Commission is concerned that this paragraph 
suggests that a county may levy a tax rate in excess of the 
certified rate, if it is below the wmaximum levy," without 
going through the truth-in-taxation procedures. The 
statutes are clear, as well as the briefs of both parties, 
in stating that a taxing entity's rate cannot exceed the 
certified rate unless the truth-in-taxation procedures of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-918 and 919 have been completed. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-912 (1996), 59-2-918 (1999) and 59-2-
919 (1999). With the exception of the portion of the opinion 
quoted above, it appears that the Court understood the law 
in this manner as well. 
For example, if the certified rate is .0025 and the 
county proposes a rate of .0028, this rate cannot be 
enforced unless the truth-in-taxation requirements have been 
met despite the fact that .0032 is the "maximum levy" 
allowed by law. This Court must recognize that the 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commission has the authority to adjust a rate in excess of 
the certified rate if the truth-in-taxation procedures have 
not been satisfied. Without such a finding, the Court's 
language as cited above may be inappropriately interpreted 
in a manner that eviscerates part of the truth-in-taxation 
statutes. 
The Commission suggests the following language to 
replace the language of the opinion cited above: 
"•}/'•,j 
The Commission has authority to adjust 
any tax rate that exceeds the certified 
rate unless the taxing entity complied 
with the truth-in-taxation requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 918 and 919 (1999 
and Supp. 2 000). Once a taxing entity 
has complied with the truth-in-taxation 
procedures, the Commission is without 
authority to adjust the adopted rate 
unless the statutes provide otherwise. 
In this case, Section 59-2-924(g) (Supp. 
2000) does not provide such authority nor 
does Section 59-2-914 (1999) since Alpine 
satisfied the truth-in-taxation 
procedures and its rate did not exceed 
the maximum rates allowed by law. 
The Court is advised that the statutes contain maximum 
rates for many different taxing entities. The maximum rate 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-908 (Supp. 2000) which applies to a 
county is one of many.1 For example, maximum rates can be 
1
 The Court is reminded that the rate at issue in this 
case was not a county rate, but a school district rate. 
3 
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found in the following additional sections of the Utah 
Code, §§ 10-6-133, 10-7-14.2, and 17A-1-430. Additionally, 
school districts such as Alpine are governed by their own 
complex set of statutes which set forth minimum and maximum 
rates for property tax levies which vary depending upon the 
purpose of the levy or use of the tax. See e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 53A-17a-143, 53A-17a-135, and 53A-16-106. 
II. THE COMMISSION IS GRANTED CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS DUTY TO ADMINISTER THE TAX LAWS OF UTAH. 
The second statement in question, found in f 13 of this 
Court's decision, reads: 
We disagree. We cannot conclude that this 
constitutional provision is self-
executing. A self-executing provision is 
one that "can be judicially enforced 
without implementing legislation." 
Spackman v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder 
County, 2000 UT 87, % 7. As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he tax commission 
is created by statute and has only such 
powers as the statute confers upon it." 
E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 109 
Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324, 328 (1946). 
Contrary to the statement above, the Utah Supreme Court 
has fully recognized the constitutional authority of the 
Commission. In Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), the Court held 
that the Utah constitution prohibits the legislature from 
4 
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conferring "the Commission's powers on other governmental 
entities." Id at 442. Moreover, the Court went to great 
lengths to recognize the "Commission's constitutionally 
bestowed power to adjust and equalize the valuation and 
assessment of property..." Id at 440. 
In addition, the Court quoted from Article XIII, 
Section 11 of the Constitution saying, u[u]nder such 
regulations in such cases and within such limitations as the 
Legislature may prescribe, it shall review proposed bond 
issues, revise the tax levies of local governmental units, 
and equalize the assessment and valuation of property within 
the counties." Id. at 441. Based on the above statements, 
the Court made it clear that the Commission does have 
authority independent from the Legislature. 
Further support for the Commission's constitutional 
authority comes from the Utah Supreme Court in Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 190 
(Utah 1991). There, the Court noted that the tax 
commission, under article XIII, has to a large degree 
assumed control over the local administration of the 
property tax system." Id. 
The Commission proposes that the following paragraph be 
5 
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inserted in place of the language of the Court's opinion 
quoted above: 
Although the Constitution grants the 
Commission authority pertaining to the 
levies of local entities, the 
Constitution plainly authorizes the 
legislature to limit this authority. The r 
legislature has limited such authority in 
this case through the enactment of 
Section 59-2-914 (1999). 
This suggested language is consistent with this Court's 
decision and more closely harmonizes this Court's decision 
with the prevailing case law established by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission respectfully petitions this Court 
for a rehearing to clarify two points of law contained in 
the decision. The Commission respectfully suggests that 
this Court change the language in ff 10 and 13 described 
above in order to make the opinion consistent with 
established law. These statements will not affect the 
outcome of this case. 
It is not the intent of the Commission to quibble with 
the Court over every phrase of its decision. However, the 
Commission does point out the two stated errors so that the 
Court will have the opportunity to correct its opinion if it 
6 
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deems appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^ day of November, 
2000 
TIMOTHY A 
Assistant 
ILY 
torney Ge 
7 
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FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before • Utah Court of Appeals 
publication in the Pacific Reporter.,.--: . NOV 16 2000 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS'"" PailletteStagg 
Clerk of the Court 
00O00- — 
Alpine School District Board 
of Education, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
State Tax Commission, Property 
Tax Division, 
Respondent. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No, 20000109-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 16, 2000) 
2000 UT App 319 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Brinton R. Burbidge and Paul D. Van Komen, Salt Lake 
City, for Petitioner 
Jan Graham and Timothy A. Bodily, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Davis. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Kl Petitioner Alpine School District (Alpine) appeals the 
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission (Commission), which 
upheld the lowering of Alpine!s 1999 adopted tax rate by the 
Commission's Property Tax Division (Division). Alpine contends 
that the Division has no statutory authority to reduce Alpine's 
adopted tax rate. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 Alpine formulated a budget for the 1999 tax year. After 
this budget was approved, the Division notified Alpine of its 
certified tax rate for ad valorem property tax. Within this 
certified tax rate was an adjustment for the change in the motor 
vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue, effective that year. This 
1. The certified tax rate is "a tax rate that will provide the : 
same ad valorem property tax revenues for a taxing entity as were 
(continued...) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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adjustment was based on an estimate by the Division of what the 
motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue would be. 
i 
H3 When Alpine received notification of its certified tax rate, 
it realized the rate would be inadequate to meet the needs of its 
budget. Therefore, Alpine proposed to the taxpayers an ad 
valorem tax rate higher than its certified tax rate. Alpine 
complied with the requirements commonly referred to as "truth in 
taxation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-918 and 59-2-919 
(1996 & Supp. 2000). The taxpayers approved Alpine's proposed 
tax rate and this rate was submitted to the Division. 
1|4 In the meantime, the Commission discovered an error in the 
Division1s calculation of the motor vehicle fee-in-lieu 
adjustment to the certified tax rate. When recalculated, the 
resulting certified tax rates were lower than those originally 
reported to the taxing entities. After Alpine submitted its 
adopted tax rate, which had been approved by the taxpayers, the 
Division lowered the rate by the same amount it had determined 
Alpine's certified tax rate should be lowered. 
^5 The Division claimed it had statutory authority to 
unilaterally lower Alpine's rate pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
59-2-914 and 59-2-924 (1996 & Supp. 2000) . Alpine appealed to 
the Commission the Division's adjustment of its adopted rate. 
The Commission recognized that the Division could not lower 
Alpine's adopted rate under section 59-2-914 alone, since Alpine 
had complied with the truth in taxation requirements. The 
Commission nonetheless upheld the Division's action based on its 
reading of sections 59-2-914 and 59-2-924 together. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
6^ The issue concerns whether the Division had authority under 
either section 59-2-914 or section 59-2-924 to lower Alpine's 
adopted tax rate. In reviewing the Commission's decision, we 
"grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of 
law, applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an 
explicit grant of discretion contained in a statue at issue 
1. (...continued) 
collected by that taxing entity for t^ ie prior year." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-924(2) (a) (1)—(Supp. 2000). Prior to 1999, property 
taxes on certain tangible personal property, such as motor 
vehicles, were based on value. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-405.1 
(Supp. 2000), enacted in 1998, provides that starting in 1999, 
the taxes on tangible personal property include a uniform fee 
based on the age of the motor vehicle. ;--••-- v.-: 
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before the appellate court." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b) 
(1996). The issue presented for our review is one of statutory 
interpretation, which is a question of law, and the Commission 
has been given no-specific grant of discretion to interpret the 
statutes at issue. See Airport Hilton Ventures v. Tax Comm'n, 
1999 UT 26,^7, 976 P.2d 1197. Therefore, we give no deference to 
the Commission's interpretation. 
ANALYSIS 
\l Preliminarily, we discuss the Commission's belatedly filed 
Motion Regarding Suggestion of Mootness. The Commission contends 
that recent legislative changes requiring the Commission to make 
adjustments to certified tax rates to equalize any errors in the 
1999 fee-in-lieu revenue estimates, as well as the fact that 
Alpine adopted a tax rate higher than the certified tax rate in 
2000, render moot the Commission's decision on the 1999 tax rate. 
Thus, any harm Alpine may have experienced in subsequent years, 
based on the lowering of its 1999 tax rate, was abrogated by its 
adoption of a 2$00 tax rate that was higher than its 1999 tax 
rate. The Commission concedes, however, that the broader issue 
of whether the Division has authority to alter a taxing entity's 
adopted rate may well arise in the future. 
U8 We have said that "'[a] case is deemed moot when the 
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants.1" 49th St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 998 
n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)). The rights of a taxing entity such as 
Alpine to adopt a tax rate pursuant- to statute without the 
Division unilaterally changing it are surely not negated by the 
fact that the taxing year in question has come and gone and 
subsequent measures were taken to correct the monetary 
difference. When a case "presents an issue that affects the 
public interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief 
time that any one litigant is affected, is capable of evading 
review," we will address the merits of the case. Burkett, 773 
P.2d at 44. 
\S The Commission argues on appeal that section 59-2-914 gives 
the Division the authority to reduce Alpine's adopted tax rate. 
That section provides, ,in part: " [i]f the commission determines 
that a levy established for a taxing entity . . . is in excess of 
the maximum levy permitted by law, the .-commission shall. .• • 
lower the levy so that it is set at the maximum level permitted 
by law." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914(1) (a) (1996). The Commission 
interprets this section to grant the Division broad discretion in 
determining whether a levy is in excess of the maximum, and then 
to reduce the levy to an appropriate level. 
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^10 The Commission found that Alpine complied with the 
requirements of sections 59-2-918 and 59-2-919, which require a 
taxing entity to notify taxpayers of a proposed rate increase in 
excess of the certified rate, and to hold hearings regarding the 
increase. See id. §§ 59-2-918, -919 (1999), This finding 
notwithstanding, the Commission claims that because the erroneous 
information the Division had provided Alpine regarding the 
certified tax rate was then used in the notice to taxpayers 
during the truth in taxation process, the Division had authority 
to lower the adopted rate. This interpretation is not consistent 
with the plain language of the statute. The statute clearly 
states that the Division may only lower the tax rate if it 
exceeds the "maximum levy." See id. § 59-2-914 (1) (a). The 
maximum levy is defined by statute as: ".0032 per dollar of 
taxable value in all counties with a total taxable value of more 
than $100,000,000 . . . ." IcL § 59-2-908(1)(a) (1996). The 
Commission acknowledged during oral argument that Alpine's 
adopted tax rate does not exceed this figure. 
Ull The Commission also argues that section 59-2-924(2) gives 
the Division th£ authority to lower Alpine's adopted tax rate. 
That section reads: 
(f) For the calendar year beginning on 
January 1, 1999, and ending on December 31, 
1999, a taxing entity's certified tax rate 
shall be adjusted by the amount necessary to 
offset the adjustment in revenues from 
uniform fees on tangible personal property 
under Section 59-2-405.1 as a result of the 
adjustment in uniform fees on tangible 
personal property under Section 59-2-405.1 
enacted by the Legislature during the 1998 
Annual General Session. 
Id. § 59-2-924 (2) (f) (Supp. 2000). The Commission alleges that 
this section was added to avoid any possible shortfalls or 
windfalls to taxing entities as a result of the change in fee-in-
lieu of ad valorem taxes charged on motor vehicles, which 
revenues are factored into an entity's certified tax rate. The 
Commission cites to statements made by legislators during Senate 
floor debates to derive the intent of the statute. In 
interpreting a statute, however, we are "guided by the principle 
that a statute is generally construed according to its plain 
language." Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 
1995). Further, "f [w]hen language is clear and unambiguous, it 
must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction.!" Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. 
Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (quoting Hanchett v. 
Burbidge, 59 Utah 127., 135, 202 P. 377, 380 (1921))."'Only when 
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we find ambiguity in the statutefs plain language need we seek 
guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations.1" Nelson, 905 P.2d at 875 (quoting World Peace 
Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 
1994)). 
Hl2 We do not dispute that section 59-2-924(2) (f) gives the 
Division statutory authority to reduce a taxing entity's 
certified tax rate pursuant to fluctuations in fee-in-lieu 
revenues. However, to also grant the Division authority to 
reduce a tax rate properly adopted under truth in taxation is to 
go well beyond the plain language of the statute. The 
legislature took great care in defining "certified tax rate" and 
providing the method for calculating the certified tax rate. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924 (2) (a) (i), (iii) (Supp. 2000). The 
legislature also differentiated between a certified tax rate and 
one adopted by the taxing entity through the truth in taxation 
procedures outlined in sections 59-2-918 and 59-2-919. We 
"presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning." Nelsfon, 905 P.2d at 875. We therefore conclude that 
section 59-2-924(2) (f) gives the Division the authority to adjust 
an entity's certified tax rate only. 
Hl3 Finally, at oral argument before this court, the Commission 
argued that it has a broad grant of constitutional authority to 
adjust tax rates pursuant to Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. Paragraph (3)(d) provides that the Commission 
M[u]nder such regulations in such cases and within such 
limitations as the Legislature may prescribe, . . . shall . . . 
revise the tax levies of local governmental units . . . ." Utah 
Const, art. XIII, § 11(3) (d). The Commission interprets this 
language as giving it unfettered authority to revise tax levies, 
except for specific statutory limitations. We disagree. We 
cannot conclude that this constitutional provision is self-
executing. A self-executing provision is one that "can be 
judicially enforced without implementing legislation." Spackman 
v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder County, 2000 UT 87,^7. As stated 
by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he tax commission is created by 
statute and has only such powers as the statute confers upon it." 
E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324, 
328 (1946). The language in section 59-2-914 (giving the 
Division the authority to lower tax rates that exceed the maximum 
levy) and in section 59-2-924(2) (f) (giving .the Division 
authority to reduce the certified tax r&te) are legislative 
grants of specific authority. In granting such specific 
authority, the legislature necessarily limited the circumstances 
in which the Division is authorized to adjust tax rates. The 
general language in the constitution regarding the Commission's 
duties, therefore, does not broaden the statutory mandate. Where 
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the legislature enacts regulations governing when tax rates can 
be adjusted, as it did in sections 59-2-914 and 59-2-924, the 
constitution simply directs that th6 Commission is the state 
agency authorized to carry out those duties. 
CONCLUSION 
f14 The Division had no authority under sections 59-2-914 and 
59-2-924(2) (f) to reduce the adopted tax rate of Alpine, 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Commission. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Hi5 WE CONCUR:t 
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